The Surge - Is the new plan working?
By Pedro Cardoso
GEO-POL SENIOR ANALYST


As the year comes to a close, demands for accountability on President Bush's new plan for Iraq start to surface. It's been almost a full year since the White House laid out "The New Way Forward", its vision for success in Iraq . Now that the election is near, the plan's performance may seriously influence political outcomes in 2008.

Integral to its success, was the establishment of a secure environment in order to allow for political development to take place. That security plan came to be known as a "surge" in troop strength. Today, we refer to it simply as The Surge.

Of the 18 objectives set up by Congress, security is understood to be a priority (especially in Baghdad). It's only under a security umbrella that many important parts of the overall plan can be accomplished, for example:

- Disarming militias (impossible without either consent or force)
- Establish law that defines autonomous regions (Kurdistan and Kirkuk oil field)
- Passing the Oil Law (interrupted by sabotage by opponents)
- Giving amnesty for peace (interrupted by revenge killings)
- End de-baathification (not accepted by Shiite militias)

- Eliminating militia control of government security branches

All together, even the most basic political negotiation is nearly impossible without security. Not only can violence reach into the Parliament building inside the Green Zone, but violence is also used as leverage amongst parties who control militias.

To be considered successful, the Surge must level the political playing field so ALL parties can rely on the political process instead of projecting power through other means; hence a massive influx of boots on the ground starting in January of 07.

As the new plan took effect, politicians (and the media) concentrated attention primarily on the military security plan. As 30,000 new troops arrived, they went straight to work, but the operation wasn't in full force until the summer of 07. Operations like Arrowhead Ripper only had minor mentions in the media, but, by the end of the year (and surprisingly to some) the results were in.

Security HAS improved


The numbers are undeniable. Although violence is still at an unacceptable level, the number of sectarian killings in Baghdad and other regions has dropped by half (Oct 2007). The news coming from many neighborhoods in Iraq is that some sense of normalcy has returned. The word in Washington is the Baghdad Security Plan and Operation Phantom Thunder has caused the violence to drop. Basrah is also showing signs of increased calm after the British pull-out.

As political tensions increase towards a 2008 election showdown, the situation in Iraq is important to both parties. As violence decreases Republicans garnish support for continuing their policy, and in some sense, get "vindicated" by the numbers. Conversely, as violence increases, Democrats are able to use those numbers as proof that the policy has failed. Caught in the middle are thousands of US soldiers and Iraqi people, all waiting for positive change.

As the year comes to a close, everyone is in agreement. Violence is down in Iraq: but why?



Baghdad’s Weary Start to Exhale as Security Improves
November 20, 2007
The security improvements in most neighborhoods are real. Days now pass without a car bomb, after a high of 44 in the city in February. The number of bodies appearing on Baghdad’s streets has plummeted to about 5 a day, from as many as 35 eight months ago, and suicide bombings across Iraq fell to 16 in October, half the number of last summer and down sharply from a recent peak of 59 in March, the American military says.

As a result, for the first time in nearly two years, people are moving with freedom around much of this city. In more than 50 interviews across Baghdad, it became clear that while there were still no-go zones, more Iraqis now drive between Sunni and Shiite areas for work, shopping or school, a few even after dark. In the most stable neighborhoods of Baghdad, some secular women are also dressing as they wish. Wedding bands are playing in public again, and at a handful of once shuttered liquor stores customers now line up outside in a collective rebuke to religious vigilantes from the Shiite Mahdi Army. NYT
The Day After

As Iraqis cautiously stroll back to the markets, (and US politicians pat themselves in the back), a ticking time bomb lays beneath Iraq. It turns out that the reason Iraq has lower violence is NOT because of successful military operations, arrests, and new tactics. The reason there's been a lull in violence is because Iraqis have negotiated their way around the Surge:

Sunnis
Everyone knows that the Americans are locking horns with Iran. Especially on the ground in Iraq, US troops are being redeployed to confront Iranian influence, and on a higher level, have been desperately looking for a connection between Iran and US casualties on the ground. It's understood that the majority of the Surge was to be directed at Shiite militias and specifically at Al Sadr.

Sensing an opportunity, Sunni insurgents (through their sheiks and with Saudi help) were able to negotiate a devil's alliance where they would re-direct their attacks at Shiites and Al Qaida instead of targeting the US Army, (in exchange for weapons and cash). A win win deal.

"There are tribal sheiks out there who say 'Hey, just allow me to be the local security force. I don't care what you call me. ... You can call me whatever you want. Just give me the right training and equipment and I'll secure my area.' And that's the direction we're moving out there," the Third Infantry Division commander said.

In a meeting with reporters, Lynch said contacts with the Sunnis, who make up the bulk of the insurgency, were a matter of pragmatism.

"They say: 'We hate you because you are an occupier, but we hate al Qaeda worse and we hate the Persians (Iranians) even worse' ... you can't ignore that whole population," Lynch said. CBSNews


Overnight, the majority of attacks on US troops were blunted by a deal with local sheiks. In other words we armed our own enemies:

U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies
By JOHN F. BURNS and ALISSA J. RUBIN
BAGHDAD, June 10 — With the four-month-old increase in American troops showing only modest success in curbing insurgent attacks, American commanders are turning to another strategy that they acknowledge is fraught with risk: arming Sunni Arab groups that have promised to fight militants linked with Al Qaeda who have been their allies in the past.
American commanders say they have successfully tested the strategy in Anbar Province west of Baghdad and have held talks with Sunni groups in at least four areas of central and north-central Iraq where the insurgency has been strong. In some cases, the American commanders say, the Sunni groups are suspected of involvement in past attacks on American troops or of having links to such groups. Some of these groups, they say, have been provided, usually through Iraqi military units allied with the Americans, with arms, ammunition, cash, fuel and supplies.
NYT


The great irony of this deal is that the United States originally invaded Iraq hoping for a similar alliance with local Shiites against Sunnis in power. (Washington's friction with Iran has since reversed that cooperation). For Iraqi Sunnis, this is a great opportunity. They can regroup, solidify their networks, gain legitimacy and completely avoid the sharp edge of the Surge altogether; but not without some risks.


Shiites

Al Sadr had plenty of heads-up on the Surge. He knew very well that the climate in Iraq had changed. US troops were openly hostile to Iranian diplomats, the American media was highlighting the small percentage of Shiite attacks (accusing them of being Iranian sponsored). Everyone and their cousins knew that the Surge was going to be pointed directly at Shiite militias, and at Al Sadr himself.

In order to protect himself from the Surge, Al Sadr ordered a complete CEASE-FIRE on all militia operations. He went underground: He knows that time is on his side, while the US suffers political turnmoil and backlash for every week of the Surge, he can wait them out for far longer.

Shi'ite leader declares cease-fire
August 30, 2007
Anti-American Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr yesterday ordered a six-month "freeze" of activities by his Mahdi Army militia, a force accused of attacking U.S.-led coalition forces and operating "death squads" targeting the country's Sunni Arab minority.
U.S. officials greeted the announcement with caution, but the move could provide a significant boost for the security "surge" now under way in Baghdad and other parts of the country. Aides to Sheik al-Sadr confirmed the young cleric's order included a ban on all attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in the country.
"We declare the freezing of the Mahdi Army without exception in order to rehabilitate it in a way that will safeguard its ideological image within a maximum period of six months," Sheik Hazim al-Araji, a top aide to Sheik al-Sadr, said in a statement read on Iraqi television.

Washington Times

Knowing that Washington made an alliance with Sunni sheiks, Al Sadr dispersed his assets and prepared himself for the "day after". His real enemies in Iraq are foreign-sponsored Sunnis bent on "blocking" Iran's influence in the region. A local cold war has started. Al Sadr knows he'll need his militia for the day he has to fight a civil war.

..Over the past year, a chorus of voices has called for Saudi Arabia to protect the Sunni community in Iraq and thwart Iranian influence there. Senior Iraqi tribal and religious figures, along with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan and other Arab and Muslim countries, have petitioned the Saudi leadership to provide Iraqi Sunnis with weapons and financial support.
...Options now include providing Sunni military leaders (primarily ex-Baathist members of the former Iraqi officer corps, who make up the backbone of the insurgency) with the same types of assistance -- funding, arms and logistical support -- that Iran has been giving to Shiite armed groups for years.
Another possibility includes the establishment of new Sunni brigades to combat the Iranian-backed militias.
Washington Post

Conclusion

The direct result of both Sunni and Shiite "bypassing" the Surge is a dramatic drop in violence. The current status-quo IS a direct outcome of increased US troops on the ground, although they might not have suppressed the militias with their weapons directly, they did it psychologically.

What is uncertain is how long can US Operations continue? A strong US presence is what's keeping everyone at bay, if soldiers start pulling back, the peace won't hold. What's worst, by arming Sunnis, the US has actually fueled a potential civil war between former insurgents and Shiite militias.

The American election in 2008 will be clouded by claims that the Surge is a success and that we're "winning" in Iraq. Its not that simple. The war in Iraq is now between local Sunni states and Iran. Washington has taken sides once again and is hedging its bets like everyone else. If a Democrat president pulls the troops out, Washington hopes Sunnis will fight the Iranians for us.

The hope today is that this brief period of artificial peace will be enough to make some solid political strides. If they pass an Oil Law, grant acceptable status to Kurds and agree on a new de Baathification policy and constitution, maybe when the militias come back out they'll find a different Iraq (maybe even an Iraq they're vested in). Unfortunately, there has been zero political progress; everyone is waiting to see what happens.

One thing has been proven, security breeds progress, as much as one may feel that peace is creeping back into Iraq, it also feels like we're back to square one. After all, security was the objective in 2003.

 


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Copyright Pedro Cardoso Geo-Pol Senior Analyst 2007

 
COPYRIGHT GEOPOL 2007 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED