GEOPOL analysis
Jan 28 2005

by Pedro Cardoso

The Iraqi Elections

The Shia faith has its “Jerusalem” in Najaf. The reason is because Mohamed’s daughter married Ali – and Ali thought he would be the natural successor to the Prophet in leading the Islamic faith. That didn’t happen, he was assassinated in Kufa (many people in the Middle East remember the Iraqis as the ones who killed the Prophets son-in-law). The Shia think of Ali as the true leader of Islam and they think the Sunnis killed him in order to change what God had ordained. Their most sacred site is Ali’s mosque in Najaf, Iraq.

Saddam Hussein, in Iran’s view, was being supported by the United States, (and Sunnis in the region) when he launched his war against the New Iran. The post-Revolution Iran saw itself as fighting dictatorship and oppression by deposing the Shah, and also as re-emerging the ‘true’ Islam descended from Ali (God’s original plan). Unfortunately, Saddam owned Najaf, so the new religious center was concentrated at Khoum inside Iran (hence the Ayatollah Khomeini). All Shia worldwide are to pay a stipend of 1/5 of their income and send it to Khoum. With no access to Ali’s mosque, Khoum is it – and Iran controls it.

When the United States pushed back the Republican Guard in 1991, Saddam was very fearful of losing power and concentrated his forces in trouble spots like Kurdish north and Shia south. After the US convinced the Shia to revolt, militias in the south started attacking the Intelligence headquarters and Baath party offices all over the south, but because the US didn’t support the uprising, Saddam retaliated. (Most likely, groups like the MEK helped Saddam capture and torture the leaders of the uprising) – Finally, many Shia ran into Ali’s mosque hoping for safety. Saddam’s troops went in, killed everyone inside, and severely damaged the mosque. Al Sadr’s father died in that uprising, the majority of the surviving Shia leaders ran to Iran for safety; all with deep resentment of both the Sunnis and the United States. (The MEK, under Saddam’s support, kept infiltrating Iran in continuous attempts to assassinate these leaders.)

Today, one of those leaders is back as a candidate. Al Hakim, after building an army inside Iran (Badr Brigades), returned as one of the most probable winners in this election. Although his brother was originally the leading figure, someone managed to kill him with a bomb after praying at Ali’s mosque. Al Hakim, the surviving brother, embodies the history of the Shia’s suffering under Saddam, their betrayal by the US, and also their “lawful” place as leaders of the “true” Islam – from Ali. All his eight brothers were assassinated. The Hakim family for decades has struggled to bring the Shiites back to Najaf. He is seen now as the most likely winner on Sunday. Hakim’s father Sayyed Muhsin Hakim was a very powerful leader. When he died, he passed on all his religious power to Al Sadr’s father, Muhammed Baqir Sadr. During the Shia uprising Baquir Sadr was assassinated by Saddam and thus passed all his influence by default to his son, the now well known Muqtada al Sadr. Al Sistani was a very good friend of Hakim’s father and now supports Hakim fully instead of Muqtada (Hakims campaign leaflets actually have Sistani’s picture on it). One thing to remember, Muqtada al Sadr is Iraqi, Sistani is Iranian – Al Hakim was nurtured in exile in Iran. One can say that the connection between Iran and the new potential president of Iraq runs through Sistani. Sadrs extremism has sidelined him. He was useful only as a show of force and his followers have been brought under Sistanis influencial umbrella not only because he saved them from the Americans, but because Sistani organized all Shia into one organization that includes Sadr and even Chalabi! Their voting success is almost guaranteed.

Because the Sunni power base was the Baath party, after the invasion, the only unifying factor amongst them was that they were the new outcasts (thus the high rate of recruitment for the insurgency). Right after the invasion, US troops fired into the crowd in Fallujah twice in two days. Operations were obviously more severe in Tikrit and many other Sunni areas. The de-Baathification of the country translated subconsciously into de-Sunnification. THEY HAVE NO UNIFYING CANDIDATE WHATSOEVER.

Allawi is SHIA – but he won’t get the Shia vote. He is very secular, seen as anti-religious – is well connected to the CIA and is a reformed Baathist (rumor has it that he personally shot some insurgents at a police station last year). He is by no means a weak man, but he has no connection to the Sunnis, after all, he’s been out of the country since the 70’s. The only vote he might get, are the seculars, the doctors, the intellectuals (those who would want Iraq to turn into Turkey) – there aren’t enough believers out there to vote him in.
The Sunnis have been pushed into a corner where on one wall is an election in which they have no candidate, on the other they have the US army continuing what they perceive as “de-Suunification”. They can only fight. Regardless of who wins, they will not accept the result.

Unfortunately for the Shia, all other countries in the region are Sunnis and subconsciously support the Sunni uprising – if not directly against US presence, most definitely and overtly against any Shia leadership.

This is where a greater plan might become visible. It’s is possible that a Shia Iraq could be a direct attack on the stability of Iran. The Bush administration could possibly take advantage of the growing student / secular unrest in Iran and boost it with an example in Iraq. Also, by opening Najaf to Shia everywhere, the religious power base switches from Khoum back to Iraq. If Al Hakim has made a deal with the US where, once in power, he asks them to stay while the US empower him and his militia – then a Shia victory could be seen as a good thing for the US.
But this would provoke a religious war in the Middle East.

Al Hakim, with US support, will start a campaign to “root out terrorism” in the “new” Iraq. Both Shia and US troops will cooperate to try to destroy the insurgency. The Shia will have no problem with this, they remember what was done to them under Saddam. The US will also try its best to disconnect Al Hakim from Iran (and Al Sistani – the Iranian). With rumors of operations already ongoing inside Iran, we can expect that the US has already started this process.

But all other Sunni countries in the region will find this state of affairs completely unacceptable. They WILL support the insurgency in Iraq and try to offset Hakim’s power. They will also support a US offensive against Iran mainly out of fear of Iran’s power-influence. Without Saddam, Iran is the next power in the region. Militarily, they can have anyone except Israel for lunch. Recent indications show that Iran has acquired the S-300 system (better than the Patriot system) and the Sunburn missile (only unstoppable cruise missile / anti-ship missile in the world), both Russian systems. They are growing an alliance with China, and diplomatic relations to Europe. Give them a nuke and all Sunnis in the region have a problem.
Something else is also disturbing; Hakim tried to institute Sharia law in 2003 but was rejected by Paul Bremer and other seculars. If Hakim turns out to be less moderate that anyone thought – it will make it harder for the US to support secular revolts in Teheran.
If Hakim wins as expected, the fight for Iraq’s future might actually take place inside his heart. Will he follow doctrine and steer the country closer to an Islamic autocracy, or will he get lured in by secularism, self-power and thus break ties with Sistani and Iran. Several recent interviews show him ascertaining that “we are Iraqis, we will decide for the future of our country, not Iran [paraphrased]”. One thing is for sure, a Shia president will have to quell a Sunni insurgency; that’s called a civil war.

The Kurds might actually end up with the shortest end of the stick. Turns out that Sunnis are NOT the minority, many Kurds are Sunnis, but they’ll always vote for a candidate that gives them autonomy. When faced with a Shia president they will play ball if that will give them power in the North. The obvious strategy will be that the Shia will fight the insurgency in the south while the US with Kurdish help will fight it in the north (Mosul). Considering that all important oil fields are in Basra and Kirkuk, the Sunni center can easily be turned into an economic wasteland. Disengagement is a potential problem. During Sadr’s uprising, Basra tried to defect as an autonomous province. There are signs that the South could separate itself economically and socially from the rest of Iraq. The Kurds would support such a concept for obvious reasons, if Turkey lets them. The relationship between the Shia and the Kurds is something to be watched in the future. Whatever promises of autonomy were made to the Kurds, they will probably not get it. Sistani killed the deal that would’ve allowed Kurds to have equal vote in a federal Iraq, Turkey has threatened military action if Kurdistan is created, the Sunnis will NOT let go of Mosul without a fight (which is ongoing right now – US Stryker Brigades are being supported by Kurdish Peshmerga to fight Sunni Arabs – the northern civil war has, for all practical purposes, started)

The US military presence will continue after the election. The Shia will NOT ask the US to leave. They need that military power concentrated on the Sunnis while they build their own power-base. Ideally, the US will try to pressure Hakim to employ his Badr Brigades as soon as possible thus allowing US troops to withdraw from the line of fire. Hakim will refuse. He’ll try to save his militia as much as possible for AFTER the Americans have left. That’s why he’ll rather spend US blood on the Sunnis and use that breathing-room to strengthen his own army.
The insurgency will turn into a unified Sunni front against the Shia and anyone (US) who supports them. They have been largely successful in all their political missions. Their guerrilla tactics turned a ‘liberation’ into an ‘ocupation’, they brought re-construction to a standstill and put foreign troops behind fortified garrisons. They have turned the dream of an election into a skeletal event where the majority of candidates have never shown their faces, ballot locations are secret to everyone (including voters) until Sunday, voters will have to walk to vote (cars are banned Sunday), which will make it easier to spot officials traveling. In short, the insurgents turned out to be a significant factor. Regardless if they did it with outside support or not (minimum amounts of foreign fighters have been found fighting in Iraq, specially Fallujah) – if there’s a general conflict between Shia and Sunnis in Iraq – ALL neighbors will get involved. The insurgency therefore will only grow from this point on.

Pedro Cardoso

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